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Abstract: 
 This thesis will analyze the Bracero Program, a temporary guest-worker program 
between Mexico and the United States that spanned twenty-two years between 1942 and 
1964. This program was a joint venture that both countries deemed necessary as a result 
of the sudden labor shortage caused by World War II. Over the course of the program 
nearly 5 million Mexican nationals participated as Braceros and worked on American 
farms and on railroads in over twenty-four states.1 Although in economic terms the 
Bracero Program was a success, providing financial stability for farmers and monetary 
compensation for Bracero workers, the development of this program over two decades 
caused many unforeseen consequences that ultimately tainted the economic success of 
this program. 
 Throughout the following thesis I will argue that the Bracero Program failed as a 
government-sponsored program. The reasons for this failure stem firstly from poor 
planning on the part of government officials, insufficient infrastructure to run such a 
program, and a lack of enforcement on the ground level. I will argue that the political 
climate of the 1940s and 1950s influenced the creation of government documents central 
to the Bracero Program. The politically charged language within these documents 
affected the U.S. perception and treatment of Bracero workers and undermined the 
structure and success of the program.  
 I will also examine the impact of illegal immigration on the Bracero Program, and 
the inadequate and unsuccessful response to remedy this problem by both the United 
1  Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1971), ix, 50. 
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States and Mexico.  
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Introduction:  
 The United States is a country shaped, influenced, and built by immigrants. 
People from around the world have flocked to the United States in search of new 
experiences and economic opportunities. While this continues to be the case, there is one 
particular period of immigration history that has affected the economic and demographic 
conditions of the United States more so than any other. The period ranging from 1942 to 
1964 is characterized by mass Mexican migration to the United States under the 
international agreement known as the Bracero Program. The Mexican and American 
governments created this program as a temporary guest-worker program in order to fill 
the labor shortage created by World War II. The program ultimately lasted twenty-two 
years and has had a lasting and profound effect on the development of the society and the 
economy of both the United States and Mexico.3 In order to understand how this program 
came into existence it is first necessary to outline and explain the general patterns found 
in the history of immigration to the United States. 
 Historian Richard White characterizes the mass movement of people into the 
Western region of the United States as a series of streams that ebb and flow throughout 
seasons, years, and decades, each flowing from a different direction and each carrying any 
vast number of people.4 While this analogy is useful in terms of tracking the arrival of 
immigrants to the United States it can be misleading when attempting to understand the 
more recent history of immigration into the Western region. Rather than looking at 
3    Manuel G. Gonzales, Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the United States 2nd ed. (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2009), 173. 
 
4  Richard White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 183. 
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immigration as a stream, which usually can only flow one direction, it is more fitting to 
use a cyclical image when describing the history of immigration into the West. The 
reasons for this are two fold. Firstly, this model better depicts how the public sentiment 
towards immigration throughout the 19th and 20th century changed according to different 
migrating populations or groups of people. And secondly, it is useful when discussing the 
movement of people into the West whose migration was temporary. By examining 
immigration into the West as a tide that rises and falls with changing public opinion, a 
tide that comes in and goes out with varying economic climates, a tide that is affected by 
political change or soothed by the calming effects of political stability, it becomes clear 
that immigration into the West is indeed a complicated history that requires careful and 
subtle analysis.5 I will apply this analogy of a moving tide to immigration stemming from 
the mid 1800s to the mid 1900s so as the reach a general consensus of what immigration 
looked like leading up the creation of the Bracero Program.  
 The migrants that traveled into the Western region of the United States beginning 
in the mid-1800s were typically Caucasian native-born Americans traveling from the 
Eastern regions of the United States. This trend was dominant due to the fact that there 
lacked any sort of legislation that specifically restricted the movement of these people 
into the Western region of the United States.6 Although the United States encouraged 
5  Although it is useful to use a tide as a metaphor for immigration it is also important to note that there are 
obvious differences between the immigrants in the metaphorical tide and the water in a real tide. Water 
molecules within a tide do not make conscious decisions to travel one way or another. Aside from the slight 
polarity of water molecules, there is nothing to attract or deter them from going in a particular direction. 
Immigrants on the other hand, are living, thinking beings. They choose when and where to migrate. 
Although it is ironic that they follow similar patterns as water molecules, it is important to separate the two 
in order to show these distinctions. It is also ironic that water, which is scarce in the West, is so often used 
as a metaphor to describe immigration, which is abundant in the West.  
6  White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own, 186. 
 Hein 9 
these immigrants to migrate in the mid-1800s, this did not mean that all immigrants 
succeeded in their quest for opportunity in the West. In addition to the movement of 
native-born Americans, there were also a vast number of non-native born white 
immigrants including people of German, Norwegian, Irish, and Scandinavian desent. 
Again, while the United States government allowed and encouraged these people to settle 
the West they, like their American-born counterparts, were not always successful in their 
ventures.7 In some cases these initial tides of people returned East after failing to establish 
themselves in the West. These trends of westward migration,  however, continued to 
develop and grow throughout the 19th century.  
 These white immigrants eventually came under scrutiny by the residents of 
Western territories and states, and a sense of hatred developed towards these newcomers. 
This shift indicates a change in American public sentiment as residents of Western 
territories and states no longer accepted the migration of these people into the West.  A 
prime example of this is the scorn and hatred that arose for the immigrants from 
Oklahoma who traveled West and who were often referred to as the derogatory term 
“Okies.”8 
 In addition to American and European immigrants who traveled into the West 
beginning in the mid-1800s, Asian immigrants also made up a measurable percentage of 
foreign-born immigrants.9 Chinese immigration in particular followed a very cyclical 
7  White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own, 186-187. 
8  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 151. 
9  White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own, 187. 
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pattern first peaking during the California Gold Rush of 1849. The majority of these first 
immigrants, however, returned to China.10 This phase represents the first of three cycles 
of Chinese immigration. Following the Gold Rush another phase of Chinese immigration 
began, and although these numbers were not as large as those of the Gold Rush era, they 
still made a significant contribution to the immigration to the West in the 1800s. This 
contribution was so significant that it prompted U.S. legislators to write the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, which essentially stopped Chinese immigration in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s. The final phase of Chinese immigration would not begin until after 
World War II, and it, like its predecessors, followed very cyclical patterns.11   
 While these distinct immigrant groups migrated for many of the same reasons, 
their individual experiences differed slightly. These differences, however, are minimal 
when the over all pattern of immigration and the consequent discrimination of these 
immigrant groups are analyzed on a larger scale. These patterns act as precedents for the 
migration of Mexican citizens into the United States in the early 1900s. And while it is 
important to understand these general patterns of migration, the underlying factors for 
Mexican migration must be analyzed and developed more fully in order to understand the 
full significance of the Bracero Program of 1942-1964.   
 Although there is a long history of movement of Mexican people throughout the 
lands that would become the American West and Southwest, Mexican immigration began 
to influence and affect the United States differently after 1848. This date is significant for 
10  White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own, 187. 
11  White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,187. 
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immigration history because with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the 
Mexican-American border underwent a lasting and drastic change.12 The American 
government formally partitioned the territory of the American West, and many people 
who had been living in northern Mexico suddenly found themselves within the borders 
and laws of another country. While this date is significant for Chicano scholars studying 
Mexican-American history and culture, I will use this date to determine a starting point 
for the study of Mexican immigration into the Western region of United States. From 
1848 until the early 1900s Mexican immigration did exist, although the numbers were 
much smaller than those of the 20th century it is still important to recognize these early 
migration patterns as precursors for later phases of immigration. 
 For the purpose of this analysis, the history of Mexican immigration to the United 
States started in the early 1900s.13 Many historians have framed this debate in terms of 
“push” and “pull” factors that contributed to the reasons why Mexicans immigrated to the 
Western region of the United States. This framework, however, has come under scrutiny 
recently due to the fact that this model can be limiting in its analysis, relying solely on set 
conditions in the sending and host countries that “function independently of each other.”14 
This type of analysis also begs the question of whether Mexican immigration can be 
viewed in a binary framework, disregarding outside factors.15 While these questions and 
12  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 58. 
13  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 113. 
14  Gilbert G. Gonzales and Raul A. Fernandez, A Century of Chicano History: Empire, Nations and 
Migration (New York: Routledge, 2003), 32-33.  
 
15  Gonzales and Fernandez, A Century of Chicano History, 34.  
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concerns are important to think about with regard to the general history of Mexican 
immigration, these factors still play an important role in laying out the context for the 
later analysis of the Bracero Program. 
 Many historians describe two major “push” factors when discussing Mexican 
immigration in the early 1900s. First, there are the policies of Mexican dictator, Porfirio 
Diaz. Historians characterize this era as a time where many Mexican citizens lacked 
political freedom and social and economic mobility.16 Although Porfirio Diaz was able to 
bring considerable material wealth to Mexico in the late 1800s and early 1900s, it was at 
a considerable price. Aside from the small elite class, the majority of Mexico’s 
population experienced little if any improvements in their economic situations during this 
era, also known as the Profiriato.17 The Mexican government sought to revive the hard-
rock mining industry and begin development in the oil industry with the support of 
foreign capital. They also used foreign capital, mostly from the United States, to build a 
vast series of railroads linking major Mexican cities to one another and to northern United 
States border towns. In addition to the development of industry under the Porfiriato, Diaz 
also began a massive process of land redistribution whereby the Mexican government 
began dividing communal ejido lands of the peasant and lower classes in order to make 
more land available to the upper class elite and Anglo entrepreneurs.18 This process of 
land redistribution drastically upset the traditional way of life for the majority of the 
16  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 115-117. 
17  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 116. 
18  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 116-117. 
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peasantry and led to even greater contempt for Porfirio Diaz and his regime. These 
policies eventually led to the second push factor that most historians cite as influential for 
migration: The Mexican Revolution of 1910.  
 The Mexican Revolution started in response to the policies of Porfirio Diaz, 
however, this revolution is also characterized as a peasant fight for land. This rebellion, 
however, soon became a struggle for political power.19 The Mexican Revolution is an 
event in Mexican history characterized by increasing violence. It is estimated that 
between 1.5 and 2 million Mexican citizens, including women and children, died during 
the Revolution.20 As fear, violence and uncertainty became part of everyday life, many 
Mexicans sought refuge in the United States.21 These two factors greatly contributed to 
the desire of Mexicans to migrate to the United States, but there are also pull factors that 
encouraged this migration. 
 The pull factors stemming from the United States are usually characterized by the 
all encompassing term “opportunity;” however, more precisely these factors were labor 
demands and higher paying wages.22 One period in particular that represents these pull 
factors occurred during World War I. In 1917, the United States faced a labor shortage 
due to the U.S. involvement in World War I. The United States government, in response 
to this dilemma, altered immigration laws in order to facilitate the migration of temporary 
19  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 118-119. 
20  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 119. 
21  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 119. 
22  Gonzales and Fernandez, A Century of Chicano History, 35. 
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Mexican workers.23 The period from 1917-1918, known as the first Bracero Program, can 
be seen as a precursor for the larger, more pronounced and complicated Bracero Program 
of 1942-1964. The creation of this initial program illustrates how important the pull and 
push factors are when discussing Mexican immigration. This program is also evidence of 
the cyclical nature of Mexican immigration into the Western region of the United States 
during the 20th century.  
 These factors continued to affect the number of Mexican immigrants traveling 
into and out of the United States in the first two decades of the 20th century. By 1929 
another factor, the Great Depression, also affected this cyclical movement of people, but 
in a less positive and encouraging fashion. The economic strife that plagued the United 
States in the 1930’s also affected the Mexican migrants.24 Due to the lack of jobs and the 
possibility of a complete collapse of industry in the United States, many Mexican 
migrants voluntarily returned to Mexico. Others were not given a choice. The repatriation 
of Mexican workers during the 1930’s was a very large undertaking that the United States 
was surprisingly able to accomplish. Some historians state that American authorities 
forcibly removed between one-third and one-half of the Mexicans in the United States to 
Mexico between 1929 and 1935.25 In addition to the Great Depression, the Dust Bowl of 
the early 1930’s also resulted in a lack of jobs and aided in the overall dismal economic 
23   Fernando Saul Alanis Enciso, El Primer Programa Bracero Y El Goberino De Mexico, 1917-1918 (San 
Luis Potosi: El Colegio de San Luis, 1999), 33-36. This source is very informative and is used in this case 
to show the existence of the first Bracero Program. This is done in order to show that the patterns of 
immigration are not necessarily unique.  
 
24  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 139. 
25  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 149. 
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situation in the United States especially in the West and Midwest. It would not be until 
the early 1940’s that Mexican immigration would return to and then surpass the pre-
1930’s rates.26   
 The history of immigration into the Western region of the United States is 
characterized by a cyclical pattern of boom and bust, and the particular history of 
Mexican immigration is no exception. Mexican immigration of the mid to late 20th 
century in general, and the Bracero Program in particular, followed the same cyclical 
patterns of previous groups of immigrants although the total number of immigrants would 
greatly increase. The importance of this period of immigration history has also grown in 
recent years and as a result the historiography of this time period has grown as well. 
 The historiography of Mexican immigration into the Western region of the United 
States during the mid to late 20th century is very rich. Many noted historians have written 
about the economic and political consequences of immigration and in particular the 
Bracero Program of 1942-1964. Historian and Professor Ernesto Galarza wrote one of the 
first comprehensive and detailed accounts of this program. Galarza published his book, 
Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story, in 1964, the same year that the 
government-sponsored Bracero Program ended. Although his account is limited in that it 
only focuses on the Bracero Program as it pertains to the State of California, it covers the 
chronological entirety of the program.27  
 Another account written less than a decade after the end of the Bracero Program is 
26  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 150-151. 
27  Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story (Charlotte: McNally and 
Loftin,1964), 9-16. 
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The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy. This piece, written by 
Richard B. Craig, chronicles the bureaucratic history of this program and analyzes how 
the international environment during this period affected the migrant workers and the 
overall health of the Bracero Program. Craig also goes into detail about how interest 
groups in both Mexico and the United States influenced the course of the Bracero 
Program.28  
 In addition to the bureaucratic and general histories of the Bracero Program, 
historians have also written about this program from a cultural perspective in order to 
include the experiences of these immigrants in the retelling of their own history. These 
accounts are usually included in works by Chicano scholars or in works about Chicano 
history. Books such as A Century of Chicano History: Empire, Nations and Migration, 
coauthored by Professors Gilbert G. Gonzales and Raul A. Fernandez, describe the social, 
cultural and economic experiences of Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans in 
20th century America.29 Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the United States, written by 
Manuel G. Gonzales is also a fine piece of history covering the experiences of Mexicans 
over the vast time period from the pre-arrival of the Spanish in the 1500s to the present.30   
 As a complement to the Chicano focus, some historians have written anthologies 
based on oral histories of Mexican immigrants. While oral histories can at times be biased 
in their interpretation, or misleading due to the realities of interviewing, they are still a 
28  Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1971), ix-xvii. 
 
29  Gonzales and Fernandez, A Century of Chicano History, xi-xv. 
30  Gonzales, Mexicanos, 1-7. 
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vital piece of the information in regard to the story of Mexican immigration. One such 
anthology, compiled by Marilyn P. Davis, Mexican Voices, American Dreams: An Oral 
History of Immigration to the United States, covers the experiences of people from a 
broad spectrum of social statuses and also a broad chronology.31  These histories, based 
on the personal experiences of Mexican immigrants offer great insight into the way in 
which the Bracero Program affected the daily lives of Mexican immigrants. 
 In addition to the thematic understanding of the Bracero Program, some historians 
have also written about this program in a comparative fashion. Seeing as this program 
was a bi-national agreement that lasted for over two decades, it seems natural that there 
are some historians writing about the Bracero program in terms of the benefits and 
consequences from the perspectives of both Mexico and the United States. This particular 
area within the historiography of the Bracero Program, however, is somewhat limited in 
its scope and could benefit from additional comparative scholarship.  
 While the historiography of this time period and of the Bracero Program are well 
developed, there is still room for improvement in scholarship regarding the historical 
study of the implementation and consequences of the program. In an effort to add to the 
historiography, I will argue that although the Bracero Program was an attempt by U.S. 
and Mexican lawmakers to alleviate an apparent labor shortage caused by World War II, 
it failed as a government program due to poor planning, insufficient infrastructure, and an 
overall lack of enforcement. I will also argue that although the program succeeded in 
stabilizing the agricultural sector of the United States, it allowed and encouraged illegal 
31  Marilyn P. Davis, Mexican Voices, American Dreams: An Oral History of Mexican Immigration to the 
United States (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), introduction. 
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immigration of Mexican nationals into the United States. This, in turn, forced the United 
States to implement another program, Operation Wetback, to attempt to alleviate the 
problem of illegal immigration. These broader arguments are broken down into the 
following chapters. 
 Chapter one of this thesis, titled The Development of the Bracero Program: The 
Consequences of Political Language within Government Documents, will focus on the 
political aspect of the Bracero Program.  Within this chapter I will lay out the reasoning 
behind the creation of the Bracero Program. I will focus mostly on government action and 
inaction, and will analyze how the political language used within the Bracero Program 
agreements and subsequent documents shaped the images, understandings, and 
experiences of the Bracero workers. By analyzing the political language in the context of 
government action and inaction I will argue that the government-sponsored Bracero 
Program caused an increase in discrimination and mistreatment of legal migrant workers. 
 Chapter two of this thesis, titled Parallel Paths: The Influence and Effect of 
Illegal Immigration During the Bracero Program, will focus on the inability of 
government agencies to control illegal immigration during the Bracero Program. Using 
primary and secondary documents, I will argue that insufficient infrastructure and 
enforcement along the Mexican border and throughout the West, initially caused by 
government inaction, led to the increased arrival of illegal immigrants that ran parallel to 
the arrival of legal contracted Braceros. I will then argue that the presence of these illegal 
immigrants aided in perpetuating the negative image of Mexicans as criminal and the 
subsequent discrimination against the legal Bracero workers. These two consequences 
ultimately undermined the success of the entire Bracero Program. 
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 Within these chapters, I will argue that the American and Mexican governments 
initially created the Bracero Program as a means of supplying needed agricultural 
assistance to American farmers during WWII. While this program was at times 
economically successful for both parties, the program itself was ultimately undermined by 
the very entities that created it. This in turn led to an under-appreciation of Bracero 
workers and an increase flow of illegal immigration. These consequences are the seeds of 
the immigration problems that these two countries face today. 
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Chapter One  
The Development of the Bracero Program:  
The Consequences of Political Language within Government 
Documents 
 
 
 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 brought the United 
States into World War II.32 This attack also indirectly led to the creation of a temporary 
guest-worker program between the United States and Mexico known as the Mexican 
Farm Labor Program, but more commonly referred to as the Bracero Program. The term 
Bracero, derived from the Spanish word braco, meaning arm, is generally translated as 
“farm hand,” and is used throughout this analysis as one word in the name of a 
government-sponsored program. It will also be used to refer to the individual Mexican 
workers who participated in the program.33  
 This chapter will focus primarily on the early years of the Bracero Program, 
ranging from 1942-1951, and will highlight how government officials and the subsequent 
documents they produced created and perpetuated a sense of animosity towards the 
invited Mexican Bracero workers. I will then apply this framework to the later years of 
the Bracero Program, ranging from 1951-1964. This chapter will also examine the 
creation of the Bracero Program in terms of how it perpetuated the development of the 
stereotypical image of Mexicans as able-bodied manual laborers and how this image, 
coupled with the political language of the time, led to instances of heightened 
32  Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 140-
142. 
 
33  Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1971), ix. 
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discrimination against Mexican migrant workers. By analyzing the Bracero Program 
within this framework, I will show how the patterns of hostility towards Braceros 
developed and blossomed throughout the 1940s and continued to escalate throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, eventually leading to the demise of the program in 1964.  
 Prior to U.S. involvement in World War II, there was a presence of Mexican 
agricultural workers in the United States despite legislation aimed at curbing immigration 
into the country. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 was an attempt by U.S. 
lawmakers to limit immigration into the country; however, through a loophole in the law 
the federal government allowed entry to Mexican agricultural workers. This law was the 
basis for legal Mexican migration into the United States until the early 1940s when 
interesting circumstances created by the United States’ involvement in World War II 
established the need for new legislation on immigration into the United States.34 
 The United States’ involvement in World War II was the catalyst for the 
increased, regulated, and immediate migration of Mexican farm laborers in to the  United 
States. Prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, many farmers throughout the West 
expressed their need and desire for additional labor and repeatedly asked the federal 
government to alleviate the labor shortfall by allowing and increasing the migration of 
Mexican agricultural workers into the United States. Many lawmakers at the time, and 
historians in retrospect, viewed the Selective Service Act of 1940 and the National 
Defense Act of 1941 as reasons for the increased urgency that many Western farmers felt 
34  Craig, The Bracero Program, 7. 
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regarding the fear of an agricultural labor shortage.35 The United States government, 
however, ignored these early requests for additional migrant workers citing that there was 
sufficient domestic labor to supply the needs of Western farmers.36 With the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, however, the federal government changed its position on the 
apparent need for migrant labor after realizing how U.S. involvement in the war would 
drastically change both the economic and demographic situation at home.  
 By May of 1942 the United States federal government realized that the farmers’ 
fears of a labor shortage were in fact becoming a reality due to the exodus of domestic 
farm laborers into U.S. military service and various wartime industries.37 As more and 
more farmers prepared for their crops to go unharvested, the federal government began 
making plans to discuss the creation of a Bracero Program with the Mexican 
government.38 At this point the United States government understood the connection 
between domestic and foreign affairs and they realized that the survival of soldiers and 
the chance at victory against Germany and Japan had everything to do with the success of 
the agricultural sector at home.39 The U.S. federal government was also aware of the 
complications that might arise when attempting to develop, plan, and implement a 
temporary worker program to alleviate this labor shortage and therefore took precaution 
35  Craig, The Bracero Program, 36-38. 
36  Craig, The Bracero Program, 38. 
37  Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Program (Charlotte: McNally & Loftin, 
1964), 43. 
 
38  Craig, The Bracero Program,39-40. 
39  Craig, The Bracero Program, 39. 
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and waited for the appropriate time to approach the Mexican government to discuss such 
a program.40 For this reason the United States federal government, although aware of the 
urgency associated with the issue of a labor shortage, waited until June 15th, two weeks 
after Mexico’s June 1st  declaration of war on the Axis powers, to begin discussions of a 
possible Bracero Program.41 
 In order to facilitate the discussion of such a program, the Mexican government 
created an inter-departmental committee to “study the various aspects of the migration of 
the braceros.”42 This committee included representatives from the departments of Foreign 
Affairs, Labor and the Interior. It was understood that these discussions and any 
subsequent agreements would be decided on by representatives from both Mexico and the 
United States and that these two parties would jointly “guarantee compliance with the 
terms of the contract.”43  The final draft of the Bracero Program agreement became 
official on August 4, 1942 after an exchange of diplomatic papers, a mere seven weeks 
after the initial discussions began.44 Both the United States and Mexico realized that these 
matters needed to be finalized with the utmost urgency albeit for different reasons.  
 Initially the Mexican government did have reservations about agreeing to 
participate in this program. These fears stemmed from previous experiences with 
mistreatment and discrimination of migrant workers during the first Bracero Program of 
40  Galarza, The Merchants of Labor, 43. 
41  Craig, The Bracero Program, 40. 
42  Galarza, The Merchants of Labor, 47. 
43  Galarza, The Merchants of Labor, 47. 
44  Craig, The Bracero Program, 42. 
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1917-1918, and from the forced repatriation of Mexican nationals by the United States 
government during the 1930s.45 In addition to these concerns many of the Mexican 
committee members viewed the exodus of so many Mexican nationals to the United 
States as detrimental to the economic growth of Mexico.46 These concerns, although 
seriously considered, did not cause enough alarm to discourage the Mexican government 
from agreeing to participate in the Bracero Program. Rather, from the discussions that 
took place over the summer of 1942, many Mexican officials began to see participation in 
this program in more positive terms.  
 One of the positive outcomes that Mexican committee members cited for 
participating in this program pertained to the new knowledge that the Braceros would 
gain regarding agricultural practices. Committee members argued that this newfound 
knowledge could then be applied to Mexico’s agricultural industries and therefore rather 
than being a detriment to the growth of the agricultural sector in Mexico, participation in 
this program would be advantageous.47 In addition, the Mexican government viewed their 
participation in the Bracero Program in economic terms and realized how this program 
could help create economic stability for those individual Mexicans who participated, thus 
creating economic wealth for Mexico as a whole.  More importantly, however, the 
Mexican government came to see their participation in this program as part of their 
45  Craig, The Bracero Program, 41. 
46  Craig, The Bracero Program, 41. 
47  Craig, The Bracero Program, 41. 
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contribution to the Allied war effort.48 These realizations convinced the Mexican 
government to agree to participate in such a migrant-worker program with the United 
States. The next step was determining what this agreement would look like and what 
provisions it would include. 
 Discussions regarding the guarantees, implementation, and duration of the 
Bracero Program began in early July 1942, and by July 22, 1942, representatives from 
both Mexico and the United States had finalized a draft of the informal bi-national 
agreement.49 Although this draft was nearly complete, certain aspects of the program were 
still being considered. According to correspondence between American Ambassador to 
Mexico, George S. Messersmith and the American Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R. 
Wickard, one piece of the agreement was still undecided: Who would be responsible for 
recruiting the Mexican laborers, the Americans or the Mexicans? Up until this point it 
was assumed that the Mexican government would take on the responsibility of recruiting 
and selecting the laborers. Under the Mexican Constitution, however, it was considered 
illegal for the Mexican government to actively recruit laborers for this program.50 After 
considering this piece of information Ambassador Messersmith adamantly insisted that 
48  Craig, The Bracero Program, 41-42. 
49  Letter from G.S. Messersmith to Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R. Wichard. July 22, 1942. p 1. As 
printed in United States Farm Security Administration, Farm Security Administration Reports and 
Miscellaneous Documents: Mexican Farm Labor Transportation Program, 1943-1944. Compiled by The 
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.  (herein after referred to as Farm Security 
Administration Reports) 
 
50  Galarza, The Merchants of Labor, 46. Galarza explains that article 123 of the 1917 Constitution 
prohibits, “unregulated hiring of its citizens for employment abroad.” 
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the United States be “primarily responsible for the recruiting and selection of labor.”51  
 In addition to the concerns regarding which government should be responsible for 
the recruiting, the correspondence between these two gentlemen also indicated which 
governmental departments should take on the responsibility of recruiting and monitoring 
this program. Messersmith urged Secretary Wickard to allow the Farm Security 
Administration, under the Department of Agriculture, to have the sole responsibility of 
monitoring and enforcing the recruitment of the Bracero Program. Ambassador 
Messersmith also insisted that if any other agencies, such as the Employment Bureau, 
Immigration Services or Public Health Services became involved with the recruiting 
process, that they should answer directly to the Farm Security Administration, seeing as 
they would have “the major responsibility” of handling recruitment concerns.52 These 
letters and correspondence offer insight into how these government officials expected the 
Bracero Program to unfold; however, they also offer valuable insight into how the United 
States government perceived the Bracero Program as a whole and the individual Mexican 
migrants that would eventually take part in this government-sponsored program. 
 Upon insisting that the Farm Security Administration, under the Department of 
Agriculture, be solely responsible for the recruitment of Mexican migrants, Mr. 
Messersmith actively encouraged the stereotypical understanding of Mexicans as “able-
bodies” capable of labor, rather than as “employees.” There existed during this time 
51  Letter from G.S. Messersmith to Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R. Wichard. July 22, 1942. p. 1 As 
printed in Farm Security Administration Reports. 
 
52  Letter from G.S. Messersmith to Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R. Wichard. July 22, 1942. p.2 As 
printed in Farm Security Administration Reports. 
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period an understanding of Mexicans, especially men, only in terms of the labor that their 
bodies could produce. Scholar Natalia Molina describes how pro-immigration advocates 
viewed Mexican migrants.53 She writes that, “immigrants were considered advantageous 
only to the extent they filled critical gaps in the labor market.”54 Molina illustrates how 
many American citizens developed an understanding of Mexicans based on “the group’s 
special affinity for manual labor” seeing as they were “uniquely able-bodied.”55  
 By placing the responsibility of recruiting these “bodies” in the hands of a 
department that has historically been responsible for monitoring commodities, Mr. 
Messersmith essentially put the United States in a position of “recruiting” the commodity 
of labor. Although later the responsibility of recruitment and monitoring of Mexican 
migrant workers would shift to the United States Department of Labor, the decision to let 
the Farm Security Administration monitor the initial recruitment did nothing to deter the 
American public and American farmers from associating the Bracero Program with the 
commodity of cheap labor, as opposed to Mexican employees.56 Despite this possibly 
unforeseen consequence, however, the two governments agreed upon the recruiting detail, 
and on August 4, 1942 the informal agreement between Mexico and the United States 
regarding the temporary migration of agricultural workers went into effect.57 
53  Natalia Molina, “Medicalizing the Mexican: Immigration, Race and Disability in the Early-Twentieth-
Century United States,” Radical History Review 94 (Winter 2006): 24. 
 
54  Molina, “Medicalizing the Mexican,” 24. 
55  Molina, “Medicalizing the Mexican,” 24. 
56  Craig, The Bracero Program, 47. The responsibility shifted from the Farm Security Administration to 
the War Manpower Commission in June of 1943. 
 
57  56-Stat-1759. 
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 The original Bracero Agreement of August 1942 was an informal agreement 
between Mexico and the United States regulating the migration of temporary Mexican 
agricultural workers. This agreement was a compromise that met the requirements of both 
the American and Mexican governments and was an attempt by both parties to protect 
their national interests and citizens. This document, although updated yearly, remained 
virtually unchanged and would serve as the legal framework for the Bracero Program 
between 1942 and 1947.58 Within the document itself, however, the use of derogatory and 
discriminating language succeeded in countering many of the provisions that the 
agreement promised to uphold and protect. 
 Among some of the most harsh language used throughout this document is the 
reference of Braceros in the economic terms of supply and demand. This language, used 
by both the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ezequiel Padilla, and the American 
Ambassador to Mexico, George S. Messersmith, degrades the Mexican nationals by 
referring to them as commodities of the state.59 In one of the letters preceding the Bracero 
Agreement of 1942, Padilla voiced his concern to Messersmith over the welfare of the 
Mexican nationals, albeit in slightly more offensive terms. Padilla wrote, “This 
Department considers itself under the obligation of pointing out the importance for the 
country at the present moment of conserving intact its human material…” 60 The term 
58  Craig, The Bracero Program,37. Both parties originally agreed to keep this program in existence as an 
“emergency measure” and was “scheduled to expire with the end of the hostilities.” The end of World War 
II did not, however, led to the end of the Bracero Program. Instead both parties agreed to extend the 
original agreement to December 31, 1947.  
 
59  56-Stat-1759. 
60  56-Stat-1759. 
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“human material” is in essence defining Mexican national agricultural workers as a 
resource of labor and as property of the state. Here again, the Bracero workers are being 
examined in terms of their bodies and their bodies’ ability to produce work for the benefit 
of the state.. The use of such degrading language in government documents only 
perpetuated the negative connotations of Mexican nationals as commodities in the minds 
of the American people. 
 Another example of the misuse of language is seen through correspondence 
between two officials in the California office of the Division of Farm Population and 
Rural Welfare.61 The correspondence is between John H. Provinse, the Acting Head of the 
Division and Davis McEntire, the Regional Leader of California. Throughout their 
lengthy correspondence these two government officials continuously refer to the ways in 
which California growers use the terms of “supply” and “demand” of labor and the need 
to “import” said labor from Mexico specifically.62  
 Provinse explained that many of the reasons that growers, especially sugar beet 
growers in California, clamored for Mexican labor was because they were believed to be 
the only migrants cable of doing “stoop labor.” He pointed out that the only other migrant 
populations semi-capable of completing the manual labor associated with beet harvesting, 
the Filipinos and Japanese, were becoming limited in “supply” due to war-time industries 
and immigration restrictions. However, Provinse illustrated how growers have attempted 
61  Letter from Davis McEntire to John H. Provinse, April 13, 1942. As printed in Farm Security 
Administration Reports. 
 
62  Letter from Davis McEntire to John H. Provinse, April 13, 1942. As printed in Farm Security 
Administration Reports. 
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to cope with this situation by requesting the “importation” of migrant Bracero labor.63 
 This letter illustrates the way in which economic language within political 
documents negatively affected the image of migrant Braceros and their experiences in the 
United States. This letter not only shows how repeated government discourse over the 
“supply” and “importation” of labor associated with migrant workers affected the 
American public sentiment in California, but it also illustrates how growers assumed that 
only specific racial groups were capable of performing certain types of manual labor. 
Provinse’s report also indicated that many beet growers were continuing to request 
imported labor. He wrote, “The petitions for importation of Mexican labor do not require 
that the labor imported be skilled beet or vegetable workers, indeed they would be very 
difficult to come by. All that is required is that they be Mexicans.”64 Again, this is 
evidence of how the political language of the 1940’s exaggerated the use of the 
stereotypical image of the Mexican and thus led to heightened discrimination and 
prejudice of these migrant Bracero workers.  
 Aside from the economic language of supply and demand used in correspondence 
between government officials, the bi-national Bracero Agreement of 1942 outlined the 
provisions that both governments agreed to uphold and enforce. However, these promises 
and provisions, listed below, did nothing to counter the government officials’ offensive 
and contradictive language. This was in part due to the fact that many of these provisions 
were not upheld by the respective authorities; however, it also stemmed from the general 
63  Letter from Davis McEntire to John H. Provinse, April 13, 1942 As printed in Farm Security 
Administration Reports. 
 
64  Letter from Davis McEntire to John H. Provinse, April 13, 1942, p.8 As printed in Farm Security 
Administration Reports. 
 Hein 31 
understanding of the time that the Mexican immigrants were only bodies capable of labor 
and they therefore did not need protection under the law. 
 Of the many promises agreed to by representatives of both the Mexican and 
American governments, the first provision of the 1942 agreement stated that no 
contracted Mexican national (Bracero) can be recruited for any aspect of military 
service.65 Representatives agreed to include this provision due to the mutual 
understanding that Mexico’s contribution to the war effort would not be in terms of 
soldiers or military support, but rather in terms of labor. Despite this provision, however, 
several military recruiting centers throughout the United States attempted to enlist 
Mexican nationals into the armed forces with the false promise of citizenship upon their 
return from war.66  
 This incident sparked concern on the part of the Mexican government, as well as 
that of the United States. The U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, requested an 
investigation into this incident and found that these recruiting centers did not have legal 
jurisdiction to grant American citizenship to Mexican nationals, and that Mexican 
nationals should not be attempting to attain citizenship. The investigative report stated 
that, “The War Department does not compel noncitizen soldiers to act in these respects. 
Persons who take the oath of enlistment, the oath prescribed for inductees, or the oath 
contained in the petition for naturalization are not recognized as naturalized solely by 
virtue of such action.” Following this report, Secretary of State Hull issued a statement 
65  56-Stat-1766. 
66  U.S. Congress. House. Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers, 1943. Volume VI. The 
American republics. 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1943, H. Doc. 811, vol. 6.  p. 396-397. 
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calling attention to the fact that “members of the armed forces can only be naturalized in 
the United States by a court authorized to naturalize aliens.”67 Although this mishap did 
not cause any tangible damage to the newly formed Bracero Program, it did cause the 
Mexican government to be suspicious of American intentions, in addition to blatantly 
defying the first provision of the agreement itself. In response to this situation, Mexican 
president Avila Camacho released a statement to the Mexican periodical, La Prensa 
stating that, “Mexico is cooperating in the same plan that it promised to do although the 
war is receding farther and farther away from our Continent everyday…Mexico, 
consequently, will not send men to the war…our obligation up to now continues to be 
production.”68 Although Mexico acknowledged this issue as a concern, it was not enough 
to deter Mexico from upholding its commitment to contribute to the war effort. 
 The second provision within the Bracero agreement of 1942, although relevant on 
paper, was less enforceable and supported in reality. This provision states that “Mexicans 
entering the United States as a result of this understanding shall not suffer discriminatory 
acts of any kind in accordance with the Executive Order No. 8802 issued at the White 
House June 25, 1941.”69 The Executive Order No. 8802, signed by FDR on June 25, 1941 
stated that, “All departments and agencies of the Government of the United States 
concerned with vocational and training programs for defense production shall take special 
67 U.S. Congress. House. Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers, 1943. Volume VI. The 
American republics. 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1943, H. Doc. 811, vol. 6. p. 397. 
 
68  U.S. Congress. House. Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers, 1943. Volume VI. The 
American republics. 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1943, H. Doc. 811, vol. 6.p. 397. 
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measures appropriate to assure that such programs are administered without 
discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin.”70 The order then stated 
that all wartime contracting agencies were required to follow this same principle. This 
order also created the Committee on Fair Employment Practice within the Office of 
Production Management. This committee was supposed to “recommend to the several 
departments and agencies of the Government of the United States and to the President all 
measures which may be deemed by it necessary or proper to effectuate the provisions of 
this order.”71 However, despite this provision, many Bracero workers experienced harsh 
discrimination from their employers. This resulted in some instances of animosity 
between the Braceros and the farmers they worked for; however, the economic needs of 
the Bracero generally out weighed the ever-present discrimination and poor conditions. 
These scenarios indicate problems that both the Mexican and American governments 
faced regarding the implementation of state-sponsored programs; and although the 
Mexican and American governments succeeded in establishing the Bracero Program 
agreement on paper, that did not guarantee that on the ground level the Bracero Program 
would function. Nor did it mean that authorities had the necessary infrastructure required 
to ensure complete enforcement of the Bracero agreement provisions.  
 In addition to the lack of enforcement that the first two provisions faced, provision 
three of the agreement of 1942, promising to provide Mexicans with “transportation, 
70  Executive Order no. 8802, Code of Federal Regulations, title 3, p.957 (1938-1943 Compilation). 
71  Executive Order no. 8802, Code of Federal Regulations, title 3, p. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation). 
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living expenses and repatriation,” also faced difficulties with enforcement.72 Other 
provisions included the legal framework for Bracero contracts. Provision number four, 
which stated that no Bracero worker could knowingly take the place of a domestic worker 
for the purpose of “reducing rates of pay,” was difficult to uphold due to insufficient 
enforcement on the ground level.73 This agreement also determined that all contracts 
would be written in Spanish under the supervision of representatives from the Mexican 
government, and although this practice was more strenuously followed, it did lead to 
certain problems of miscommunication between all parties involved. These contracts, 
however, also led to other possibly unforeseen consequences for the Bracero workers. 
 These contracts, written in Spanish, would represent the interests of three parties 
including the “worker,” representing the Mexican farm laborer, the “employer” 
representing the Farm Security Administration within the Department of Agriculture, and 
the “sub-employer” representing the owner or operator of American farms.74 By legally 
contracting individual Mexican citizens to do work for a government agency that claimed 
to represent American farmers, the American government essentially created a system 
whereby the Mexican nationals had no legal voice with which to argue or defend their 
interests and rights. 
 This 1942 Bracero Program Agreement also outlined requirements and 
72  56-Stat-1759. This provision stated that Article 29 of the Mexican Labor Law protected these guarantees. 
Article 29 of the Mexican Labor Law states that, “ It shall be unlawful to use persons less than eighteen 
years of age for the furnishing of services outside of the Republic, except in the case of technicians, 
professionals, artists, athletes or, in general, specialized workers.” 
 
73  56-Stat-1759.  
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stipulations that the Mexican nationals needed to meet in order to be eligible to 
participate in the program. In order to be admitted into the program, Mexican health 
authorities required that all Mexican nationals pass certain physical examinations and be 
in good physical health. In theory, the Mexican and American governments included this 
requirement in the agreement for sanitary and international health precautions; however, 
these examinations became a means by which to judge, exclude and discriminate against 
Mexican nationals on the basis of their physical condition. In most instances recruiting 
officials first quickly examined the hands of applicants looking for rough calloused hands 
as proof of their experience with manual labor.75 The image below depicts an instance of 
this preliminary screening.   
 
“At the Selection Unit typists initiated forms for workers. The men were questioned about their agricultural 
experience. A preliminary examination was made for calluses on their hands and other indications of 
agricultural work.”76 
 
75  University of California, “Agricultural Personnel Management Program: Division of Agricultural and 
Natural Resources,” Labor Management Decisions vol. 3 no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1993). 
http://are.berkeley.edu/APMP/pubs/lmd/html/winterspring_93/gallery.html. 
 
76  University of California, “Agricultural Personnel Management Program,”  
http://are.berkeley.edu/APMP/pubs/lmd/html/winterspring_93/gallery.html. 
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 Other elements within the recruiting process were equally discriminatory and in 
many cases more degrading. The following image illustrates part of the humiliating 
contracting process that most Braceros experienced at recruiting centers throughout 
Mexico. 
 
“Medical staff included doctors from both the U.S. and Mexican Federal Health Departments. Examination 
went from head to toe.”77 
 
Images such as these indicate how government officials inspected all Mexican nationals 
in terms of their bodies’ physical condition under the pretext of health. These procedures 
are evidence of the many ways in which American authority figures viewed and judged 
Mexican nationals along stereotypical lines established and supported by the federal 
government. 
 Other general provisions of the 1942 agreement included guarantees relating to 
adequate housing and sanitary facilities. These pieces of the agreement were supposed to 
protect Bracero workers from dismal living conditions by providing that “housing 
77  University of California, “Agricultural Personnel Management Program.” 
http://are.berkeley.edu/APMP/pubs/lmd/html/winterspring_93/gallery.html.   
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conditions, sanitary and medical services enjoyed by workers admitted under this 
understanding shall be identical to those enjoyed by other agricultural workers in the 
same locality.”78 Although this provision entitled Mexican Braceros to equal housing and 
sanitary conditions, most Braceros lived in dismal surroundings and lacked sufficient 
medical treatment. The experiences of Alberto Mendoza Torres sheds light on how 
uncomfortable this situation was for some Braceros.   
 Alberto Mendoza Torres worked as a Bracero picking strawberries in California 
and later Colorado and he experienced first hand the problems associated with the no 
n-enforcement of the medical treatment provision.  Through a personal interview 
conducted with support from the University of Texas, El Paso, Mr. Torres recounted his 
experience of becoming ill from the food served in his Bracero mess hall. 
 After contracting a stomach flu from eating poorly cooked eggs, Mr. Torres 
continued to work although he hadn’t received any medical attention. Since he did not 
receive any medical attention, he asked the farmer he worked for to send him back to 
Mexico so that he could attend to his health. After working an additional fifteen days, the 
farmer finally agreed to release Mr. Torres from his contract so that he could return home 
to Huatecolco, Cuernavaca to seek medical attention. Upon returning home, Mr. Torres 
remained sick for six months and lost a considerable amount of weight due to the fact that 
he was unable to eat without agonizing abdominal pain. After visiting a homeopathic 
doctor in Huatecolco, his health began to improve; however, he remains frustrated to this 
day about the way his employer in Colorado did not acknowledge his medical condition, 
78  56-Stat-175. 
 Hein 38 
even though his Bracero contract guaranteed him access to medical services.79 This case 
highlights one of the ways in which the American government and the farmers they 
represented failed, or chose not to enforce, many of the initial provisions within the 
Bracero Program agreement of 1942. This case also illustrates poor planning on the part 
of government officials and a lack of infrastructure necessary to guarantee contractual 
rights to participating Braceros. The lack of enforcement of these provisions also 
showcases how an attempt at alleviating a labor shortage in the United States ultimately 
failed due to the multiple broken promises and the inability of the American government 
and American farmers to resolve the problems associated with this program.  
 The United States and Mexico originally created the Bracero Program as an 
emergency wartime relief effort with the understanding that this program would become 
unnecessary with the end of the war.80 When the war ended in 1945, however, the Bracero 
Program did not lapse. In fact, both countries agreed to extend the program until 
December 31, 1947.81 They argued that because of a worldwide food shortage that still 
existed, the program was warranted.82 Historians have also cited the creation of the G.I. 
79  Violeta Dominguez, "Oral History Interview with Alberto Mendoza Torres," in Heritage West, Item 
#55845, http://heritagewest.coalliance.org/items/show/55845, Accessed at 
http://hdl.handle.net/10176/UTEPmor07 
 
80  Craig, The Bracero Program, 47.  
81  U.S. Congress. House. Farm supply program. February 24, 1947. -- Committed to the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 80th Cong., 1st sess., February 24, 1947, 
H. Rpt. 70. This document chronicles the reasons why the program was not extended passed December 31, 
1947. Firstly they cited that the funding for the recruitment and transportation of Bracero laborers was 
scheduled to expire with the expiration of Public Law 45, which had allocated 26 million dollars to the 
implementation of the program.  
 
82  Craig, The Bracero Program,42. The original agreement did under go some minor changed in 1943, but 
these amendments did not change the any of the original provisions.  
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Bill of 1944 as a reason why the United States did not end the original Bracero Program.83 
Among the many provisions within the G.I. Bill, the second provision provided funding 
for education in the way of tuition, books, fee, and a stipend for living expenses for 
returning war veterans. This bill allowed a large majority of the returning veterans to seek 
higher education as opposed to returning to do manual agricultural labor, and U.S. 
farmers argued that because of this phenomenon, there continued to be labor shortages 
and the need for Bracero workers. Due to these arguments, Mexico and the United States 
agreed to discuss a possibly extending the Bracero Program past December 31, 1947. 
 The second phase of the Bracero Program began in January 1948 and lasted until 
July 1951. Although the agreements that would emerge during this phase of the program 
were very similar to those of the Bracero Agreement of 1942, they were markedly 
different in one respect.84 Unlike the agreement of 1942, that entrusted the recruiting and 
processing of Bracero workers to the United States government, the Bracero agreements 
of March and April, 1947, February 1948 and August 1949 gave the full responsibility of 
recruiting to the farmer or his “representative.”85 Although the responsibility of recruiting 
had shifted, it did not mean that the process became less humiliating for the Bracero or 
any easier for the farmer. Before farmers were able to recruit Braceros, they first had to 
get certification from the Department of Labor stating that there was indeed a labor 
83  Committee on World War Veterans’ Legislation, House of Representative, “Statement of Benefits 
Provided by So-called G.I. Bill,” S. 1767, 78th Congress, 1-4. 
 
84  Craig, The Bracero Program, 51-53.  
85  Craig, The Bracero Program,53. Although the United States was no longer fully responsible for 
recruiting, farmers still worked “in cooperation with Mexican and American authorities to perform this 
task..”  
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shortage in their areas. The fact that this certification came from the Department of Labor, 
rather than the Department of Agriculture, which was responsible for certifying labor 
shortages prior to 1947 shows a shift in responsibility. This shift of responsibility is 
significant in that it shows an attempt by the United States to correct its prior mistakes 
regarding their perceptions of Mexicans as commodities rather than workers. This shift of 
power was a step made by the United States to reverse previous decisions about Mexican 
laborers; however, any gains made through this decision were quickly lost because of 
alterations made to the provisions of the 1948 and 1949 Bracero Agreements. 
 These two agreements removed or drastically changed many of the privileges that 
the 1942 Agreement granted Braceros.86 The 1948 Agreement specifically removed 
clauses that stipulated a competitive minimum wage, and a minimum piece-rate 
guarantee.87  The 1949 Agreement also removed the provision requiring employers to 
invest 10 percent of the Bracero’s salary into a savings plan.88 The removal of these 
provisions did nothing to improve the situation of Bracero workers, but rather made their 
experiences worse than before; however, despite the worsened working conditions, 
Mexican nationals still saw an opportunity to make more money than they otherwise 
would have in Mexico. With the conclusion of the Mexican Revolution, the Mexican 
government had made an effort to improve everyday conditions for Mexican citizens by 
86  As I argued previously, the 1942 Agreement theoretically granted Braceros rights and privileges, 
however, U.S. and Mexican authorities and American farmers usually did not enforce or uphold these 
provisions, yielding them virtually useless. 
 
87  Craig, The Bracero Program, 54. A piece-rate guarantee is a means of determining a wage. Usually a 
wage is determined for each unit of production at a fixed rate. This wage is pre-determined by the employer.   
 
88  Craig, The Bracero Program, 54.  
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expanding the industrial sector of the economy. However, they paid little attention and 
offered even less assistance to the agricultural sector. For this reason many Mexican 
nationals, despite the new pro-farmer Bracero Agreements, continued to clamor for 
Bracero contracts.89 However, international politics would soon intervene and create an 
opportunity for Mexico and the United States to draft a new agreement regarding 
Mexican labor. 
 On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded and quickly overtook South 
Korea.90 The invasion and attack of North Korea, and the Korean War that followed, 
acted as catalysts for reworking the Bracero Program in much of the same way that the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor triggered the creation of the first Bracero Program 
agreement in 1942. The legislation that followed was S. 984, which amended the 
Agricultural Act of 1949.91 Through subsequent amendment this piece of legislation 
became Public Law 78 and the cornerstone legal document for the third phase of the 
Bracero Program.92  
 Like its predecessors, this piece of legislation reflected the interests of both 
Mexico and the United States. However, unlike its immediate predecessor, Public Law 78 
89  Craig, The Bracero Program, 60. The number of would-be Bracero’s did not decline despite these new 
agreements. Rather, the number of Braceros who worked in the United States between 1948 and 1951 
exceeded the numbers of the wartime Bracero Program, 1942-1947. The number of workers, however, 
continually exceeded the number of available Bracero contracts, which led to a spike in illegal immigration. 
This dynamic is discussed in greater detail in chapter two.  
 
90  Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900, 186-190. 
91  63-Stat-1051. 
92  Congress sent S.984 to the White House on July 2, 1951. President Truman signed it into law on July 13, 
2915. After meeting with Mexican officials in August 1951, the U.S. congress amended Public Law 78 to 
include the 1951 accords. These pieces of legislation together would become the legal framework for the 
Bracero Program from 1952-1964, although these agreements were updated and extended every two years.  
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returned the responsibility of recruiting to U.S. government agencies.93 The U.S. 
government, under pressure from Mexico, also agreed to make a more ardent effort at 
enforcing the provisions of this piece of legislation. Public Law 78 also authorized the 
construction of processing and reception centers along the Mexican border, rather than in 
the interior of Mexico. American authorities argued that having these facilities closer to 
the American border would facilitate in the transportation of Braceros to their respective 
employers.94 Public Law 78 also had stronger language aimed at curtailing the abuses 
regarding mistreatment and discrimination that the previous agreements lacked.95 Also, 
P.L. 78 denied Bracero contracts to employers who had knowingly hired illegal 
“wetbacks.”96 However, along side these provisions, Public Law 78 also had a clause 
regarding the funding of this program. 
 In previous Bracero agreements of 1942-1949 the United States set aside 
appropriations to fund the recruiting of Braceros and other processes associated with the 
program. Public Law 78, however, did not include separate legislation regarding funding. 
Instead P.L. 78 included provisions that required American farmers to “indemnify the 
United States for any losses; to reimburse the government for essential expenses of the 
program, not to exceed fifteen dollars per worker, and to pay the government a sum…in 
93  65-Stat-119.  
94  The construction of reception centers along the border was a cause of great concern for Mexico. They 
believed that the proximity of these centers coupled with the large number of Mexican nationals unable to 
secure a contract would result in an increase in illegal immigration, which did in fact happen. These 
phenomenon will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter.  
 
95  65-Stat-119. 
96  Craig, The Bracero Program, 74. 
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cases where workers were not returned to the reception center as provided in the 
contract.”97 These clauses essentially made farmers financially liable to the government in 
exchange for participation in the program and access to Bracero labor. In other words, 
Public Law 78 required farmers to pay for their Braceros in addition to paying their 
Braceros. Public Law 78 basically put farmers in the business of renting the services of 
their Braceros.98 This reading of P.L 78 draws directly from previous arguments regarding 
how political language within Bracero-related government documents created an 
atmosphere where exploitation and mistreatment of Bracero workers ran rampant despite 
promises to protect the legal and civil rights of these Mexican nationals. 
 The United States and Mexico extended and updated Public Law 78 and the 
Bracero Program Agreement of 1951 in 1953, 1955, 1958, and every year between 1960 
and 1963. However, these amendments did little to change the core provisions of the 
1951 agreement. These amendments also were unsuccessful in revising the groundwork 
of the 1942 agreement or any subsequent agreement. The United States and Mexico, over 
the course of twenty-two years, did, however, succeed in creating a system whereby 
Mexican nationals were scrutinized and judged based on their bodies’ ability to do 
manual labor. These agreements also succeeded in perpetuating negative stereotypes and 
strengthening false preconceived notions about Mexicans. Due to the lack of enforcement 
of the provisions within these agreements, many Mexican nationals worked in dismal 
conditions with little or no means of improving their circumstances. Within the 
97  Craig, The Bracero Program,73.  
98  David Bacon, “Immigrant Workers Ask Labor ‘Which Side Are You On?’” WorkingUSA vol.3 no.5 
(January, February 2000): 15. Some harsh critics of the Bracero Program go a step farther than the concept 
of “renting” and claim that the Bracero Program was an institutionalized version of “legalized slavery.” 
 Hein 44 
documents and correspondences associated with the Bracero Program, discriminate and 
ambiguous language indirectly encouraged acts of mistreatment of Bracero workers. 
More importantly, however, this language coupled with the lack of enforcement of the 
agreements’ protectionist provisions, directly undermined the success of the Bracero 
Program and left a legacy of a failed international attempt to alleviate a national problem.  
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Chapter Two  
Parallel Paths: The Influence and Effect of Illegal Immigration  
During the Bracero Program, 1942-1964. 
 
 Between the years 1942 and 1964, the United States and Mexico entered into 
various agreements designed to alleviate agricultural labor shortages within the United 
States. These agreements, collectively known as the Bracero Program, were also a means 
through which millions of Mexican farm laborers traveled legally into the United States 
to work. During this same time period, however, the illegal immigration of millions of 
Mexican nationals into the United States also occurred with the utmost frequency. This 
phenomenon of illegal immigration directly paralleled the legal immigration of contracted 
Braceros.99 The impact of illegal immigration during the entirety of the Bracero Program, 
1942 to 1964, ultimately aided in undermining the success of the Bracero Program by 
creating competition between Braceros and illegal Mexican workers - often times referred 
to as Wetbacks100 - while at the same time perpetuating another negative stereotype, that 
of Mexicans as criminals. The presence of illegal Mexican laborers also negatively 
affected the perception of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in general, and the 
American sentiment towards the legally contracted Bracero workers specifically.  
 Although the issue of illegal Mexican immigration existed in the United States 
prior to 1942, it wasn’t until the creation of the Bracero Program that many American 
99  Kelly Lytle Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration: A Cross-Border 
Examination of Operation Wetback, 1943-1954.” Western Historical Quarterly vol. 37 (Winter 2006): 423-
426.  
 
100  The term wetback refers to Mexican national who crossed the Rio Grande to gain illegal access to the 
United States. The concept was later expanded to include all immigrants who entered the United States 
illegally by crossing the U.S.-Mexican border. 
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politicians viewed the unrestrained and unlawful exodus of Mexican nationals across the 
U.S.-Mexico border as a real problem.101 Prior to the 1920s, many Mexican nationals 
were able to cross the border into the United States with relatively little trouble; however, 
the creation of the Border Patrol within Immigration and Naturalization Services102 and 
the implementation of this service in the 1940s forced the United States government to 
reevaluate the threat of an un-patrolled and unsecured border with Mexico.103  
 The United States originally created the Border Patrol under INS within the 
Department of Labor. It initially attempted to curtail illegal immigration of European and 
Asian immigrants who were bypassing the quota system of the 1924 Immigration Act by 
gaining access to the United States through Canada.104 The United States then 
commissioned the Border Patrol to protect northern and southern borders against certain 
contraband, especially the importation of alcohol during the prohibition era. During the 
1930’s the Border Patrol played a relatively small role in protecting the southern border 
with Mexico, and an even smaller role in repatriating Mexican nationals during the 
Depression.105 In 1940, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt suggested that the Border 
Patrol and the INS be transferred to the Department of Justice, due to fears that the Axis 
powers would attempt to breach U.S. security through its southern border with Mexico. It 
101  Juan Ramon Garcia, Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workers in 
1954 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980), 106-108. 
 
102  Herein after referred to as INS.  
103  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 106-108. 
104  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 106-109. 
105  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 106-108. 
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wasn’t until the mid-1940’s that the Border Patrol began to function, although 
ineffectively, as an agency responsible for protecting the U.S.-Mexico border by 
attempting to prevent the crossing of illegal Mexican nationals into the United States.106   
 There was also a growing concern on the part of the Mexican government 
regarding the untamed and seemingly uncontrollable exodus of illegal Mexican nationals 
to the United States. In addition to the points mentioned earlier regarding Mexico’s 
reasons for agreeing to participate in the Bracero Program, the Mexican government also 
hoped that the presence of such a temporary guest-worker program would create a legal 
pathway for Mexican nationals to travel into the United States to work, thereby 
eliminating the flow of “wetbacks” into the United States.107 In retrospect, this conclusion 
could not have been farther from reality. There have been multiple studies indicating how 
the presence of the Bracero Program encouraged illegal immigration in many ways.108  
 One of the reasons for the increase in illegal immigration during the Bracero 
Program years directly relates to the outrageous number of Mexican nationals who hoped 
to participate in the Bracero Program. In reality, there were only so many Bracero 
contracts available, and yet the number of applicants constantly exceeded this number. 
Correspondence between Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and the American Ambassador 
to Mexico, George Messersmith, illustrates the extent to which Mexican nationals 
clamored to participate in the Bracero Program. Messersmith, commenting on the 
106  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 106-108. 
107  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 35-36. 
108  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 64. 
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recruiting process in Mexico City in January of 1943 writes, “Our Farm Security people 
engaged in recruiting agricultural laborers are somewhat embarrassed by the fact that 
5000 laborers are applying for approximately 1000 jobs presently being filled.”109 
 Although the disproportionate numbers are staggering, the visual image of this 
situation is equally, if not more shocking. In the image below, thousands of Mexican 
workers wait outside of the stadium in Mexico City, hoping for a contract through the 
Bracero Program. These men were simply hoping for an opportunity to work legally in 
the United States through the Bracero Program in order to make enough money to support 
their families in  Mexico.  
 
 
“These men had learned through newspapers and word of mouth about the opportunity to work in the 
United States. Many had been standing for five days and five nights when the photo was taken.”110 
109  U.S. Congress. House. Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers, 1943. Volume VI. The 
American republics. 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1943, H. Doc. 811, vol. 6.p. 531. 
 
110   Originally printed by University of California, “Agricultural Personnel Management Program: Division 
of Agricultural and Natural Resources,” Labor Management Decisions vol. 3 no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1993). 
http://are.berkeley.edu/APMP/pubs/lmd/html/winterspring_93/gallery.html.  
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 Another detriment to the success of the Bracero Program that also affected the 
increased flow of illegal migration, was the practice of bribery. Scholar Juan Ramon 
Garcia illustrates one way that Mexican nationals used the “mordida” or bribe in order to 
secure a Bracero contract and gain legal access to the United States.111 One of the reasons 
bribery was so common, aside from the historic and cultural use of bribery in Mexico, 
was the fact that paying a mordida sometimes guaranteed a contract to a Mexican national 
who had already invested a great deal of time and money in trying to secure a Bracero 
contract.112 Bribery, for those who could afford it, was a way to succeed in securing a 
contract; however, it also led to two major consequences that seriously undermined the 
legality and implementation of the Bracero Program.  
 Firstly, for those Mexican nationals who could not afford to pay the bribe, yet had 
wasted time and resources to travel to a recruiting center, returning home was not an 
option. Faced with this scenario, it made sense for many Mexican nationals to continue 
on their journey to the United States and cross the border without a secured contract in 
hand, hopeful that they would find work in the United States. This practice therefore 
greatly increased the number of Mexicans coming into the United States without proper 
documentation.113 Secondly, the acceptance and widespread use of bribery by low-level 
Mexican officials legally undermined the Bracero Program. This presence of bribery 
111   Garcia, Operation Wetback, 35-37. 
112   Garcia, Operation Wetback, 35-37. 
113   Garcia, Operation Wetback, 35-37. 
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within the recruiting process proves that the Bracero Program lacked sufficient 
supervision within its ranks, however, and more importantly it is evidence of inadequate 
infrastructure needed to operate this program effectively and efficiently.  
 In addition to the ways in which inadequate infrastructure led to illegal 
immigration, the Bracero Program also began operating without first establishing 
sufficient policing forces to monitor the border. This contributed to the creation of an 
atmosphere where illegal border crossings happened relatively frequently. Although the 
United States government created the Border Patrol in the 1920s, its main purpose at that 
time was not to prevent the illegal crossing of Mexican immigrants into the United 
States.114 By the 1940’s, however, the patrol’s objective changed and focused more on 
illegal Mexican immigration. According to the Mexican government, however, this U.S. 
Border Patrol’s policing efforts were not doing enough to curb the flow of illegal 
immigration of Mexican nationals into the United States. As mentioned earlier, the 
permanent loss of Mexican nationals was one of Mexico’s greatest concerns115 and the 
inability of U.S. policing agencies to alleviate this problem created serious tension 
between the Mexican and American governments.116  
 On December 11, 1943, the Mexican Embassy wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State 
114   Garcia, Operation Wetback, 36-38. 
115  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal immigration,” 425. There were a variety of 
reasons that contributed to Mexico’s growing concern over the exodus of its citizens to the United States. 
These reasons were based in the assumption that many countries around the world would view this exodus 
as evidence of the failure of the Mexican Revolution in 1910, and as the inability of the Mexican 
government to provide adequate opportunities for economic, political and social mobility of it’s citizens. 
Mexico was also aware of how illegal immigration was draining the country of one of its most sought after 
resources, “cheap and flexible labor.” 
 
116  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration,” 421- 429. 
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and publicly requested that the United States “adopt the measures which may be 
appropriate to prevent illegal entry of Mexican workers [into the United States] not in 
possession of Bracero contracts.”117 This request followed efforts made by the Mexican 
government to increase the numbers and efficiency of their own border patrol personnel. 
To show the urgency of this situation, Mexico then warned the United States that if they 
did not take action to reduce the number of illegal entries into the United States and 
increase the numbers of deportations to Mexico that the Mexican government would 
“affect a complete revision of the Bracero agreement.”118 On December 12, 1943, in 
response to this threat a representative from the U.S. Department of State, J.F. McGurk,  
issued a statement acknowledging the severity of the problem and the United States 
commitment to alleviate all of Mexico’s concerns.119 
The State Department considers it desirable to cooperate in this respect 
with the Mexican Government in every appropriate manner, and any steps 
which the Immigration and Naturalization Service may take to maintain or 
to extend its vigilance to prevent clandestine and illegal entry of Mexican 
workers into the United States will insure the continuance of these 
important Bracero agreements and will therefore rebound to the benefit of 
both Governments.120 
     
This statement illustrates the extent to which the United States valued the Bracero 
Program. They understood the importance of the program for the agricultural sector of the 
economy and for the war effort, and at the same time they understood the necessity of 
117  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration,” 427-428. 
118  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration,” 428. 
119  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration,” 428. 
120  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration,” 428. 
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fostering good relations with Mexico. Therefore they agreed to increase their efforts to 
secure the southern border. However, this incident more importantly illustrates how 
illegal immigration was a problem that hindered the success of the Bracero Program from 
very early on. Many historians cite the problem of illegal immigration during the 1950s as 
reason for the demise of the Bracero Program; however, illegal immigration occurred 
throughout the entire lifespan of the Bracero Program. Larger-scale problems associated 
with illegal immigration that occurred after later years of the Bracero Program are firmly 
rooted in instances of illegal immigration that occurred during the early years of the 
program. This is a prime example of just how serious illegal immigration was for both the 
Mexican and American governments and for the development of the Bracero Program.    
 This situation also led the U.S. Border Patrol to begin intentionally targeting 
Mexicans in an attempt to increase the number of deported illegal immigrants. As part of 
this effort, the U.S. Border Patrol began an “intensive drive on Mexican aliens” by 
creating “Special Mexican Deportation Parties,” which consisted of small groups of 
Border Patrol personnel instructed to “target, apprehend and deport undocumented 
Mexican nationals.”121 These types of campaigns continued to develop and grow 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, eventually influencing the creation of Operation 
Wetback of 1954; and while at times these campaigns were successful in deporting illegal 
immigrants, they did not alleviate the problem of illegal entry.122  
121  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration,” 428. 
122  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration,” 429-431. The U.S. Border Patrol 
deported thousands of Mexicans nationals by removing them from the interior of the United States to the 
U.S.-Mexican border. But many of these people would simply return to the U.S. illegally the next day. 
Therefore U.S. officials began working more directly with Mexican officials, and deportees were deported 
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 Although the presence of wetbacks was very detrimental to the Braceros, the 
Border Patrol’s efforts of rounding up “Mexicans” had equally dire consequences for the 
Mexican-Americans and for legally contracted Bracero workers. Through the media 
coverage of policing and deportation campaigns, such as the one listed above, the 
American public began to view anyone of Mexican desent as criminal. This created an 
atmosphere that was not only dangerous for Mexican Braceros but it also led to 
discrimination and a complete lack of appreciation for legally contracted Bracero 
workers. These efforts also created situations that were not conducive for the successful 
existence of the Bracero Program. 
 Other instances of illegal border crossings directly affected the wages and 
experiences of contracted Braceros. Once such incident occurred in Texas in 1948 when 
recruiting began for the fall harvest of cotton. The Texas growers, weary of U.S. 
government regulations, intentionally created a situation that resulted in the illegal 
crossing of six thousand non-contracted Mexican migrant workers to pick cotton. When 
Mexican officials learned that Texas growers were only going to grant Bracero workers 
$2.50 per hundred pounds of cotton, instead of the $3.00 per hundred pounds which was 
the prevailing rate, Mexico discouraged contracting with Texas as a means of “protecting 
to central Mexico via train. There are many reports of these deportees jumping off of the trains, however. 
Some sources say that men would jump if they were close to their hometowns, rather than being stranded in 
Central Mexico. Others say that people jumped to avoid punishment by the Mexican authorities. These 
train, and later airlift, however were expensive, and could not keep up with the flow of illegal immigrants 
into the United States, and therefore these programs were not very successful.     
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their nationals from what it considered extremely offensive local customs.”123 This 
situation then led Texas growers and U.S. immigration officials to spread rumors of 
available work, essentially encouraging illegal immigration. It is estimated that Texas 
growers paid these illegal immigrants no more than $1.50 per hundred pounds of cotton, 
half of the initial wage.124 After the picking, the immigration officials arrested these 
illegal wetback workers, seeing as they were aware of their illegal status. This is an 
example of how American farmers encouraged illegal immigration as a means of keeping 
their costs low; however, it completely undermined the Bracero Program and any efforts 
made by the Border Patrol to limit or discourage illegal immigration. Cases such as this 
also illustrate how American farmers acted without understanding or concern for the 
consequences of their actions. 
 Despite efforts made by both the American and Mexican border officials, the flow 
of illegal immigrants continued to grow throughout the remainder of the 1940s and 
through the early 1950s. Every year between 1949 and 1954 the number of apprehended 
illegal wetbacks exceeded the number of legally contracted Braceros. The numbers for 
each year are staggering, and prove that the efforts of the Border Patrol did not come 
close to fixing the problem of illegal immigration, but rather weakened the integrity of the 
Bracero Program.125 This trend caused great concern for both the Mexican and American 
123  Ernesto Galarza. Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story (San Jose, California: The 
Rosicrucian Press, 1964),  46-47, 50.  
 
124  Galarza, Merchants of Labor, 50.  
125  Craig, The Bracero Program, 58. The statistics for these years are as follows. 1949: 107,000 Braceros 
and 278,538 Wetbacks. 1950: 67,500 Braceros and 458,215 Wetbacks. 1951: 192,000 Braceros and 
500,628 Wetbacks. 1952: 197,100 Braceros and 543,538 Wetbacks. 1953: 201,380 Braceros and 875,318 
Wetbacks. 1954: 309,033 Braceros and 1,075,168 Wetbacks. Statistics originally printed in “Long-Term 
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governments and for that reason the United States took a radical approach and created a 
national immigration program, called “Operation Wetback” aimed at apprehending and 
deporting mass numbers of illegal Mexican immigrants.126 The architect of Operation 
Wetback, U.S. Attorney General Herbert Brownell, modeled this national program after 
the smaller scale deportation efforts of Border Patrol Inspector, Albert Quillin of South 
Texas.127 In 1950, Quillin started using a new strategy whereby he and a group of twelve 
Border Patrol officers and a small convoy of vehicles set up temporary immigration 
checkpoints on the outskirts of small cities and towns in Texas. Each day they would 
choose a different location and attempt to apprehend wetbacks. At the end of the first four 
days of using this strategy they apprehended over 1,000 illegal Mexican nationals.128 After 
Brownell borrowed and enlarged Quillin’s initial idea, he appointed Joseph M. Swing as 
Commissioner of Immigration and charged him with the implementation and planning of 
Operation Wetback. 
 Swing’s first step towards implementing Operation Wetback was to reorganize the 
U.S. Border Patrol in order to make it more efficient and affective.129 Then Swing 
organized a special commission that he charged with designing the elements of the 
program. This commission included three veteran Border Patrol officers, Charles Kirk, 
trends in Foreign-Worker Employment: Table 3, Foreign Workers Admitted for Temporary Employment in 
U.S. Agriculture,” Farm Labor Developments (February 1968): p.10.  
 
126  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 169. 
127  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration,” 440.  
128  Hernandez, “The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration,” 441. 
129  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 173. 
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G.J. McNee and John P. Swanson. Swing entrusted them with the task of developing 
“Mobile Task Forces.” These forces would be small mobile units of patrol officers 
responsible for monitoring areas and corridors with high concentrations of wetbacks.130 
They would begin massive round-ups of “illegal” aliens with the hopes that those illegal 
immigrants who were not captured would voluntarily return to Mexico out of fear.131 
 In May of 1954, after the commission finished developing a blueprint for 
Operation Wetback, representatives from the U.S Departments of State, Labor and INS 
met with officials from the Border Patrol and representatives from Mexico. They agreed 
that Operation Wetback would begin in earnest on June 1, 1954132 and would focus 
primarily in California and Arizona.133 They also agreed that the first round of deportees, 
apprehended through a series of road blocks, would be “bus-lifted” to the U.S.-Mexican 
border, where upon arrival the Mexican authorities would organize and implement “train-
lifts” bound for central Mexico.134  After the first day of round-ups, Border Patrol officers 
delivered more than 1,000 illegal Mexican immigrants on 72 Greyhound buses to 
Mexican officials at the border. 
130  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 174. 
131  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 177. U.S. media coverage only heightened  fear felt by many illegal 
Mexican immigrants because the coverage “aided in creating an increasingly hostile environment against 
illegals.” This media situation also created in the minds of the American public that these illegal immigrants 
were criminal “invaders.” For this reason, the majority of the American public was in support of Operation 
Wetback. This atmosphere also threatened the safety and wellbeing of legally hired Bracero workers, due to 
the fact that most media coverage did not make an effort of separating the two.  
 
132  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 175-178. Due to complications regarding Mexico’s agreement to provide 
adequate facilities for holding deportees, Operation Wetback did not commence until June 10, 1954.  
 
133  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 183. 
134  The Mexican and American authorities decided to remove all deportees to Central Mexico with the 
hopes that it would deter immediate re-crossing. 
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 Interestingly enough, the Mexican government completely supported this 
operation despite their stance on previous U.S.-driven deportation campaigns. Historian 
Juan Ramon Garcia describes Mexico’s sentiments regarding Operation Wetback. 
The Mexican government fully approved of the planned roundup. It had 
advocated and demanded that the United States do something to control 
the border. While it would have preferred that the action be in the form of 
penalty legislation against employers, it nonetheless viewed the operation 
as a positive step in the right direction. Mexican officials were more than 
happy to let the United States assume the initiative, responsibility, expense 
and onus of controlling the border.135     
  
 Other groups within the United States also supported these measures. The 
American G.I. Forum of Austin Texas is one prime example. In a report compiled in June 
of 1953, titled What Price Wetback? the forum urged the United States government to 
take action against the flood of wetbacks entering the United States. They argued that the 
presence of these illegal immigrants caused a multitude of problems affecting the U.S. 
economy, national security and health, and living and working conditions of Americans 
and Braceros.136  
 Newspapers across the country also commented and reported on the negative 
effects of the wetback phenomenon. Journalist Gladwin Hillel wrote an article for the 
New York Times in 1954 titled, “Two Every Minute Across the Border: Mexican 
“Wetbacks” Continue to Invade the U.S. in an Unending - and Uncontrollable - 
135  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 175. 
 
136  American G.I Forum, Texas State Federation of Labor, “What Price Wetbacks?” (Austin TX: Allied 
Printing Trades Council, June 1953): 1-3. 
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Stream.”137 In this article, Hillel noted how the presence of wetbacks caused considerable 
damage for Mexican-American and Bracero workers. Hillel reported that many farmers 
were unable to distinguish between legal Bracero, wetback or Mexican-American 
citizens. This caused confusion among growers and created a sense of competition among 
Braceros and wetbacks. Hillel states that the presence of wetbacks during the Bracero 
Program created competition that was a “vicious economic circle that had been turning 
ever since Mexicans were imported on a large scale during the World War II manpower 
shortage.”138 In addition to reporting on the damages caused by wetbackism, this article 
also alluded to the consequences of illegal immigration within a temporary-guest worker 
system. Hillel explained that, “the availability of migratory and particularly wetback labor 
demonstrably depresses wage levels.” Since these wetbacks were willing to work for 
cheaper wages farmers did not feel pressured to pay contracted Braceros the “prevailing 
wage.”139 This then led farmers to choose wetback labor over legally contracted Bracero 
labor which drastically undermined the program and created dismal living and working 
conditions for both legal and illegal Mexican laborers alike.  
  The presence of such a large number of illegal immigrants during the Bracero 
Program made the American public weary of any government programs related to 
Mexican laborers. This caused great concern for American farmers, due to the fact that 
137  Gladwin Hillel, “Two Every Minute Across the Border: Mexican “Wetbacks” Continue to Invade The 
U.S. in an Unending - and Uncontrollable - Stream,” The New York Times (January 31, 1954): SM13, 41-
42. 
 
138  Hillel, “Two Every Minute Across the Border,” 41. 
139  Hillel, “Two Every Minute Across the Border,” 41-42. 
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they depended on this labor. The American media coverage of this phenomenon also 
fostered a feeling of weariness and uncertainty due to the fact that many media sources 
depicted Mexicans as criminal.140 In an effort to ease or restrict the illegal immigration 
that threatened the success of the Bracero Program, the United States implemented a 
national program aimed at apprehending and deporting wetbacks. Although Operation 
Wetback succeeded in removing more than one million illegal Mexican workers, this 
program did not seriously address the ease through which Mexicans entered the country 
illegally. For this reason illegal immigration continued to plague the success of the 
Bracero Program until the program’s termination in 1964.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140  Multiple articles from the New York Times, The Chicago Daily Tribune, indicate this trend between 
1949 and 1964. 
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Conclusion: 
 
 The Bracero Program of 1942-1964 affected the lives of nearly 5 million Mexican 
nationals and millions of American farmers. The program, originally designed as a 
wartime emergency relief effort, lasted for over two decades. While many historians 
argue that this program was successful, I have argued that any successes associated with 
this program are overshadowed by the program’s many shortfalls. Although the creation 
of the Bracero Program allowed the United States and Mexico to showcase their skills at 
diplomacy,141 the end result of their efforts created a system with detrimental effects for 
the participating Mexican nationals and a legacy of mistreatment and discrimination 
towards migrant workers. 
 The United States and Mexico worked diligently to create an international 
agreement that would fit the needs of both parties. Both Mexico and the United States had 
their own reasons for participating in this program. The United States desperately needed 
agricultural laborers to fill labor shortages caused by World War II and Mexico urgently 
needed a means to stop the illegal exodus of its citizens into the United States. These 
reasons, however, were not unique to the 1940s. The United States experienced labor 
shortages during World War I and in response to these shortages they turned to Mexican 
labor.142 The concern of illegal Mexican immigration has also been a concern for the 
141  Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1971), ix, 50. 
 
142  Fernando Saul Alanis Enciso, El Primer Programa Bracero Y El Goberino De Mexico, 1917-1918 (San 
Luis Potosi: El Colegio de San Luis, 1999), 33-36.  
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Mexican government since the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution.143 Although this first 
Bracero Program differed slightly from its predecessor, it illustrates that this phenomenon 
of the United States turning to Mexico for labor was not a new tactic developed during 
World War II. The fact that both the United States and Mexico participated in a 
temporary guest-worker program prior to the 1940s suggests that both countries had 
practice with this sort of program and that the 1942-1964 program should have been a 
success. While this program can claim certain successes related to economic stability, the 
failures resulting from poor planning, a lack of infrastructure, deliberate misconceptions 
perpetuated through government documents, and a rise in illegal immigration all over-
shadow the successes of the program, rendering the Bracero Program of 1942-1964 a 
failure. 
 The language used throughout the Bracero Program Agreements allowed and 
encouraged the use of certain stereotypical understandings of Mexicans. Central to these 
misconceptions was the notion that Mexicans were only “able-bodies,” worth what their 
bodies could produce in terms of manual labor.144 This in turn allowed American farmers 
to take advantage of their Braceros. Other issues regarding the language within the 
Bracero Agreements created an understanding of Mexicans as commodities.145 It 
reinforced the concept that the Bracero Program fostered a system of “legalized slavery” 
143  Manuel G. Gonzales, Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the United States 2nd ed. (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2009), 58. 
 
144   Natalia Molina, “Medicalizing the Mexican: Immigration, Race and Disability in the Early-Twentieth-
Century United States,” Radical History Review 94 (Winter 2006): 24. 
 
145  Craig, The Bracero Program, 47. 
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through which the labor of Mexican nationals was bought and sold.146  
 From the onset of the Bracero Program, the United States was ill prepared for 
monitoring and enforcing this program. The lack of a sufficient policing force along the 
border allowed a steady flow of illegal immigrants to enter the United States without 
proper documentation.147 The fact that there existed illegal immigrants willing to work for 
less than the hired and contracted Braceros created competition between the groups and 
undermined the reasons for the program. Bribery was also a major problem that 
flourished in the recruiting centers due to the fact that the United States and Mexico 
lacked sufficient supervision of the lower level officials.148 This increase of illegal 
immigration also led to many media sources criminalizing Mexicans, without 
differentiating between “wetback” or legally contracted “Bracero.”149  
 Although the creation of the Bracero Program fostered good relations between the 
United States and Mexico, the American treatment of Bracero workers weakened these 
relations. Despite the fact that the Bracero Program created an atmosphere of heated 
relations and a reality of mistreatment, Mexican nationals continued to clamor for 
Bracero contracts. In many instances Mexican nationals choose the poor conditions and 
146  David Bacon, “Immigrant Workers Ask Labor ‘Which Side Are You On?’” WorkingUSA vol.3 no.5 
(January, February 2000): 15. 
 
147  Juan Ramon Garcia, Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Illegal Immigrants in 1954 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980), 35-38. 
 
148  Garcia, Operation Wetback, 36-37. 
149  Ronald, L. Mize and Alicia C.S. Swords, Consuming Mexican Labor: From The Bracero Program to 
NAFTA (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), xxxvi. 
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mistreatment in the United States to that of Mexico.150   
 The legacy of the Bracero Program is riddled with contradictions much like the 
history of immigration into the United States is riddled with contradictions. This program 
left traces of an earnest attempt to satisfy the needs and alleviate the problems of both 
nations and individuals. However, in reality the Bracero Program created more problems 
than it could every have attempted to remedy. The repercussions of this program are still 
being felt by both countries to this day.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
150  Mize and Swords, Consuming Mexican Labor, 20. 
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